-2 -investment or more specifically deficits and interest rates. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find a negative correlation between budget deficits and private investment in a large cross-section of 125 countries.
There are few India-specific studies of crowding out. Kulkarni and Erickson (1995) apply a vector autoregression (VAR) model to Indian budget deficits, interest rates, price level, and exchange rates and find no statistically significant evidence of crowding out. In the context of India it is not surprising to find no relationship between government deficit and interest rates since the latter has been controlled by the Reserve Bank of India until very recently.
Moreover, as the ultimate measure of crowding out is the reaction of private investment to government investment, it seems more appropriate to analyze these variables directly. Serven (1996) finds that in India government investment in non-infrastructure projects crowds out private investment in the long run in the context of a semi-dynamic model where only private investment is used as a regressor. A more comprehensive study of a fully dynamic model is necessary in order to fully determine whether crowding out was in effect in India. 1 In the following sections, a brief background of India's macroeconomic situation leads into the description of the model, followed by a discussion of the empirical results and the conclusion.
I. Background
Post-independence, India focused on improving economic growth through a state-led, centrally-planned, growth strategy of rapid industrialization through capital-intensive industries.
2 In addition to investing in traditional areas of public investment, such as infrastructure, the government 1 Note that we are interested in short-run interactions between government and private investment. In the medium to long run, government investment, for example in infrastructure, can enhance the productivity of private investment. We do not examine medium to long run impacts in this paper.
2 Dubey (1994) provides details on India's development strategy since its independence, which is nicely summarized in Serven (1996) .
-3 -was also competing with the private sector in commercial and industrial activities. The private sector also faced many other obstacles such as a complex regulatory system, licensing of firms' activities, barriers to foreign trade, and mandatory credit allocation schemes imposed on the banking system. In 1991, several reforms reduced the extent of public sector involvement in commercial and industrial activities. However, public sector involvement remained an important part of the economy.
As a result of this growth strategy, India's economy has grown by impressive amounts. The real per capita GDP growth of India has increased from an average of 1.26% during the 1960s to an average of 3.70% during the 1990s, and 4.04% during the first half of the current decade.
This public sector led-growth came at the cost of a large budget deficit financed by domestic borrowing. India's budget deficit has grown from 4.01% in 1960, culminating to 9.28% in 1986 and returning back to the range of 5.00% during the current decade. The persistence of the deficit reflects heavy domestic borrowing by the government to finance government investment. In fact, not only has the government been borrowing increasingly large amounts but, as demonstrated in figure 1 below, it has been borrowing primarily from the private sector where the private sector has been holding an increasingly larger proportion of government debt. 
II. The Model
We investigate the issue of crowding out more thoroughly applying a SVAR framework to government investment (GI), private investment (PI), and GDP, all in annual real per capita terms. A SVAR model is necessary since the reduced form VAR does not allow us to assess the impact of an increase in government investment on private investment and GDP. Suppose the reduced form VAR model is written as:
3 Post-1987, private investment has grown so dramatically partially due to the series of reforms undertaken in the mid-1980s through the 1990s, including financial liberalization.
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where C(L) is a matrix of lag polynomials of finite order, L is the lag operator, X t is the natural logarithm of the variables of interest (X t = [ln GI , ln PI , ln GDP]'), and u t is the vector of reduced form residuals. We assume that the VAR residuals are correlated with each other. Consequently, a shock to one variable will contemporaneously impact other variables. The implication of this is that we cannot extract the effect of a shock to one variable, for example government investment, on the time path of another variable, for example private investment.
The estimation of a SVAR model provides us with a means of assessing the impact of an increase in government investment on private investment and GDP. The SVAR methodology defines a relation between the VAR residuals (or unexpected shocks) and the structural shocks (the independent shocks which are exogenous and uncorrelated with each other):
Where e t is the vector of structural shocks, A and B are the matrices that set the linear relationship between the structural shocks and the VAR residuals, u t . The system is identified by imposing restrictions, based on economic theory, on the elements of A and B. The remaining elements of A and B are estimated.
4
The relation between VAR residuals and structural shocks in this model are defined as follows: The system is identified by specifying the automatic effects of economic activity on government investment,
GDP GI
a . In similar spirit to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , the automatic effects of economic activity on government investment can be characterized in two sets of effects. First, the automatic effects of economic activity on government investment, given government policy. Second, a discretionary adjustment made to government investment as a reaction to unanticipated changes in GDP. The first effect is quantified as a one percent increase in government investment for a one percent increase in GDP. 6 The second effect is not relevant in this model since the bureaucratic 5 Private investment typically responds to lagged, not current, GDP. Consequently private investment shocks do not respond to GDP shocks. -7 -process of learning about an unanticipated change in GDP, formulating a response, receiving government (legislative approval), and executing the response is a very slow process in India that can take more than a year. This is especially the case for government investment projects, given their immense financial aspects and long-term nature. Consequently, unexpected changes in government investment move with concurrent unexpected changes in GDP, GDP GI a = 1.
III. Estimation and Results
In our estimation we use the logarithm of annual real per capita data on consolidated Interpreting the structural shock to government investment as a policy shock, given it is an exogenous shock, the presence of crowding out is detected by the reaction of private investment to a policy shock to government investment. The results of estimation, presented in Table 1 pairwise both the trace and maximum eigen-value criteria accept the null hypothesis of no cointegration for each of the pairs (GI,PI) and (PI, GDP). For the pair (GI,GDP) the null hypothesis of no cointegration was again only just rejected at the 5 percent significance level. 10 The results of the differenced model also support crowding out.
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The dynamic effect of a structural shock to government investment on private investment and GDP are consistent with the theoretical predictions of crowding out. The impulse repsonse function and its 95 percent confidence interval are presented for private investment and GDP in figures 3 and 4, respectively.
Short-run crowding out is supported by the initial depression of private investment following a one standard deviation structural shock to government investment. The impulse response function and the entire confidence interval are below zero in the period the structural shock to government investment is applied as well as the following period. Gradually, the impulse response function of private investment rises just above zero reflecting that crowding out is not present in the medium to long term. This result is consistent with the idea that government investment may complement private investment in the medium and long terms. The reaction of GDP to a one standard deviation structural shock to government investment also supports crowding out. The impulse response function of GDP and its confidence interval remain closely around zero. This can be explained by considering the combined paths of private and 11 See footnote 1.
-10 -government investment in response to a structural shock to GDP. The reduced private investment counteracts the positive response of government investment resulting in GDP remaining relatively unstimulated, as would be predicted by crowding out. 
IV. Conclusions
Over the last thirty-five years government investment undertaken by the Indian authorities no doubt had a positive impact on the economy in the long-run. For example, infrastructure such as roads and power, have tremendously supported private sector development. The short-run impact of government investment in India has been less positive. Empirical evidence suggests that government investment has been crowding out private investment. Perhaps, India may have had a higher pace of growth with a little less government investment.
To better understand the extent of crowding out, the examination of quarterly data is necessary as a next step. This is challenging as the Indian authorities do not publish quarterly data on government and private investment. With quarterly data, crowding out can be tested on a decade by decade basis. In particular, was the extent of crowding out more or less after the Indian government undertook reforms beginning in 1991?
-11 -In addition, the estimation of a larger system that includes government consumption could add more information to the system. A comparison can also be made as to whether government investment or government consumption has a stronger crowding out effect.
Finally, future work may explore the short run costs of crowding out with the potential medium to long run benefits of government investment on private investment. This paper discussed only the short-run relation of government investment on private investment. In the medium and long run there is the possibility of a positive relation in the sense that government investment in infrastructure may facilitate private investment.
